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S U M M A R Y
The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was first described in September 2012
and to date 86 deaths from a total of 206 cases of MERS-CoV infection have been reported to the WHO.
Camels have been implicated as the reservoir of MERS-CoV, but the exact source and mode of
transmission for most patients remain unknown. During a 3 month period, June to August 2013, there
were 12 positive MERS-CoV cases reported from the Hafr Al-Batin region district in the north east region
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In addition to the different regional camel festivals in neighboring
countries, Hafr Al-Batin has the biggest camel market in the entire Kingdom and hosts an annual camel
festival. Thus, we conducted a detailed epidemiological, clinical and genomic study to ascertain common
exposure and transmission patterns of all cases of MERS-CoV reported from Hafr Al-Batin. Analysis of
previously reported genetic data indicated that at least two of the infected contacts could not have been
directly infected from the index patient and alternate source should be considered. While camels appear
as the likely source, other sources have not been ruled out. More detailed case control studies with
detailed case histories, epidemiological information and genomic analysis are being conducted to
delineate the missing pieces in the transmission dynamics of MERS-CoV outbreak.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-sa/3.0/).
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Since the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) was first described in September 2012,1 there have been a total
of 206 cases of MERS-CoV infection with 86 deaths (41.7% mortality
rate) reported to the WHO.2 All cases have had links to the Middle
East and the majority of cases (156 with 63 deaths (40% mortality)
have been reported from KSA as of March 15, 2014. We previously
reported family3 and healthcare associated4 case clusters of MERS-* Corresponding author. Deputy Minister for Public Health, and Director WHO
Collaborating Center for Mass Gathering Medicine Ministry of Health, and Professor,
Al-Faisal University, Riyadh 11176, KSA.
E-mail address: zmemish@yahoo.com (Z.A. Memish).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2014.03.1372
1201-9712/ 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).CoV infections where human-to-human transmission occurred
between index cases and their contacts. Whilst camels have been
implicated as the reservoir of MERS-CoV,5–7 the exact source(s) and
mode of transmission for most patients remain unknown. Serology
consistent with a common MERS-CoV like virus in camels has been
demonstrated by several studies5–7 and recently evidence has
emerged of a MERS-CoV infection in a camel and in humans in
contact with these camels.8,30
During a 3 month period, May 31, 2013 to August 31, 2013,
there were 12 confirmed MERS-CoV cases reported from the Hafr
Al-Batin district in the north east region of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (KSA). Hafr Al-Batin has the biggest camel market in the
entire Kingdom with 500,000 camels being reared there. Hafr Al-
Batin annually hosts drovers of more than 100 camel herds,
comprising around 10,000 camels, from various regions of KSA,ciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
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known locally as ‘‘Mazayin al-Ibl, meaning ‘‘The Best of the Herds,’’
and attracts more than 160,000 people9 from November-
December to March each year. This festival was the first to be
established in the region and subsequently other camel festivals
were started in neighboring countries: Qatar, Kuwait and UnitedFigure 1. (A) The epidemiologically defined transmission pathway of the two MERS-CoV c
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epidemiologically-possible contacts of Patients 1, 3 and 8 are marked by arrows. (B) Dete
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transmission between the pair (with no direction implied), red arrows indicate that
transmission were performed as previously described.4Arab Emirates. Since evidence is accumulating that camels are a
zoonotic reservoir for MERS-CoV, we conducted a detailed
epidemiological, clinical and genomic study to ascertain common
exposure and transmission patterns of all cases of MERS reported
from Hafr Al-Batin and relate it to other available genomic
sequences from KSA and globally.lusters. Markers for each MERS case were placed by sample date (x-axis) and colored
icated within each marker. The age and gender of each case are indicated, and
rmination of genetically plausible transmission for the Hafr Al-Batin Cluster 2. Time
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cted sequence for the clade was used. Green arrows indicate statistically plausible
 transmission between the pair is not supported statistically. Statistical tests of
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2.1. Selection of MERS-CoV cases
MERS-CoV cases reported from the Hafr Al-Batin region were
selected for study. Epidemiological, clinical and laboratory details
were collected. Clinical information included demographic data,
clinical symptoms and signs, co-morbidities, contact with animals
and travel history
2.2. MERS-CoV testing and genomic analyses
All suspected cases meeting the basic MERS-CoV infection
criteria were confirmed in Saudi Ministry of Health regional
laboratories by reverse transcription, real-time-PCR as previously
described.4 MERS-CoV genomic sequences were available from a
subset of the Hafr Al-Batin MERS cases.10 These viral sequences were
used to test possible transmission routes for the virus and establish
the plausibility of epidemiologically suspected virus transmissions
using a previously described statistical test of transmission.4 Briefly,
the expected number of sequence changes between two sequences
was calculated as the product of the time interval between sampling,
the evolutionary rate of the virus, and the maximum length of
sequence shared by the two virus genomes. If the number of
differences between two sequences accumulating in a given time is
assumed to follow a Poisson distribution, with l equal to the
expected number of mutations, the probability of finding this
number of differences between the two sequences by chance can be
calculated from the cumulative density function of the Poisson
distribution. A transmission pair was rejected if the number of
observed mutations exceeded the 95% upper cumulative probability
value. To reduce the chance of type 1 statistical errors due to
multiple testing, a Bonferroni correction was applied to the
significance cutoff, resulting in an adjusted significance level of
3.85  10–3. The rate of evolution of MERS-CoV has been estimated
at 1.12  10–3 substitutions per site per year (95% credible interval
[95% CI], 8.76  10–4; 1.37  10–3).10 To account for uncertainty in
the evolutionary rate of the virus, the transmission tests were
repeated at the 95% upper and lower credible intervals and checked
for consistency in the results.
In addition, a plausibility test was added. A reproductive time
for MERS-CoV has been estimated at 7-12 days,11 which represents
the time from symptom onset in a primary case to symptom onset
in a secondary case. This estimate is largely derived from hospital-
based infections which may be dominated by patients with renal
failure and other co-morbidities,4,12 as well as close contact with
infected cases resulting in an underestimate of the generation
time. For testing the global transmission of the virus, we includedTable 1
shows symptomatic and asymptomatic cases and comorbid conditions.
Cases Age Gender Comorb
Pt1*
Index case Cluster 1
21 M none 
Pt2 56 F none 
Pt3*
Index case Cluster 2
38 M DM 
Pt4* 79 F DM, HT
Pt5 26 M none 
Pt6 16 M none 
Pt7 7 F none 
Pt8* 47 M Obesity
Pt9 46 F DM, HT
Pt10 3 F none 
Pt11 18 M none 
Pt12* 74 F DM, HT
* Symptomatic case; DM=Diabetes Mellitus,HTN= hypertension, HD= Hemodialysis; an asymptomatic period when a patient might still be infectious,
estimating that a case remains infectious for 14 days, and assuming
that identification would occur within 7 days of infection. Thus,
any two cases might be plausibly directly linked if they meet the
statistical sequence test and the two sample dates differ by 21 days
or less. This calculation was used to assess the likelihood that virus
transmission occurred directly between two test cases and was
applied to all cases infected with the Hafr-Al-Batin_1 MERS-CoV
variant.
2.3. Statistical analysis
A chi-squared test was used to assess the associations of
comorbidities and clinical presentations, with p values <0.05
considered significant.
3. Results
3.1. MERS-CoV cases and clusters
Between May 31, 2013 and August 31, 2013, there were 12
confirmed MERS-CoV cases in the Hafr Al-Batin area. Two index
cases and two clusters were noted. In Cluster 1, the index case
Patient 1 (as defined by first date of diagnosis) was a 21 year-old non-
Saudi shepherd with onset of symptoms on May 31, 2013 and a
secondary case, Patient 2, a healthcare worker contact had who had
an asymptomatic infection (Figure 1A). Cluster 2 involved a 38 year-
old Saudi male, Patient 3, who owned and directly cared for camels,
and had onset of symptoms on August 8, 2013. Patient 3 was closely
associated with five additional MERS cases (Patients 4-8) and Patient
8, one of the secondary contacts of Patient 3, was associated with an
additional four MERS cases (Patients 9-12, Figure 1A).
3.2. Comorbidity and Clinical Presentations
Of the 12 cases, five (41.7%) had contacts with camels. The first
index (June 2013) case (Patient 1) was a shepherd. In the two
clusters, five patients died including the 2 index cases and 3 of their
close contacts (four out of the five mortalities had comorbidities).
Of those with comorbidities, all had diabetes mellitus, three had
hypertension, and one was also obese and was a smoker.
Comorbidities were present in four (80%) of the five symptomatic
cases and in one (14%) of the seven asymptomatic cases (p = 0.07)
(Table 1).
All symptomatic cases had fever, cough, shortness of breath and
four (80%) complained of sore throat. Two (40%) had headache, one
(20%) complained of hemoptysis and one (20%) had nausea
(Table 2).idity Outcome Animal Contact
died yes
alive no
died yes
N died no
alive yes
alive yes
alive no
, DM, HTN, smoking, HD died yes
N alive no
alive no
alive no
N died no
M = male; F= female.
Table 2
Clinical Presentations among symptomatic cases.
Symptom No. of cases %
fever 5 100
sore throat 4 80
cough 5 100
shortness of breath 5 100
hemoptysis 1 20
nausea 1 20
headache 2 40
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The contact investigation was carried out for both family
contacts and healthcare worker contacts. Among the family
contacts, 7 out of 36 (19.4%) tested positive and 1 of 51 (2%)
healthcare worker contacts tested positive for MERS-CoV (p =
0.0078).
3.4. Genetic tracing of MERS-CoV transmission and possible linkages
For the Hafr Al-Batin Cluster 1 we obtained a full MERS-CoV
genome from the index Patient 1 (Hafr-Al-Batin_1_2013), however
no useful sequence could be obtained from the only positive
contact in that cluster (Patient 2, a health care worker). For Cluster
2, MERS-CoV genomic sequences were obtained from Patient 4
(Hafr-Al-Batin_5_2013), Patient 5, (Hafr-Al-Batin_4_2013), Patient
8 (Hafr-Al-Batin_6_2013) and Patient 12 (Hafr-Al-Batin_2_2013).
We were unable to obtain sequence from Patient 3, however an
ancestral sequence for the entire family clade was reconstructed
and used as a surrogate for the Patient 3 sequence. Possible
transmission routes are indicated in Figure 1B. Each patient is
indicated by a filled circle placed by sample date, blue-filled circles
indicate patients with sequence, grey-filled circles indicate cases
with no available sequence and the orange-filled circle represents
the reconstructed ancestral sequence.
Individual cases in the second Hafr Al-Batin transmission
cluster were plotted by date of the sequenced sample (Figure 2).
Blue-filled circles indicate cases with sequence data, the orange-
filled circle for Patient 3 indicates that an ancestor sequence for the
clade was reconstructed and used as a surrogate, grey-filled circles
indicate cases with no available sequence. Some transmissions are
statistically allowed including Patient 3 to Patient 8 and Patient 4, 5
or 8 to patient 12 (green arrows). However, transmission from
Patient 3 to Patient 4 or Patient 5 is not likely to have occurred
(dashed red arrows); other sources of the infection should
therefore be considered for Patient 4 and Patient 5.
To examine MERS-CoV sources on a broader scale, the possible
transmissions amongst all patients known to have been infected
with the Haf Al-Batin variant were tested (Figure 2). The Hafr-Al-
Batin_1 clade was first observed in Patient 1 (Hafr-Al-Batin_1) in
May 201313 and since then has been identified in 19 MERS
patients10 and 1 camel8 in Riyadh, Hafr Al-Batin, Madinah, and
Qatar.
All MERS cases were depicted by sample date and color-coded
by virus clade as previously described 10 (Figure 2, upper panel). All
statistically supported transmissions are marked by arcs connect-
ing the relevant patients. Several important patterns appear. The
viruses Hafr-Al-Batin_1, Riyadh_8, Riyadh_12 are linked to a large
number of possible pairs. Hafr-Al-Batin_1_2013 is an early virus in
this clade and may be representative of the camel to human
zoonosis that gave rise to this clade, showing linkage to 10 of the 19
cases infected with the Hafr-Al-Batin_1 clade virus. The 4 linkages
from Riyadh_8, 3 linkages from Riyadh_11 and 4 linkages from
Riyadh_12 viruses may provide important clues. These are viruses
from patients in Riyadh with no direct links to the Hafr Al-Batinregion and no contact with animals, including camels. Within a
period of one month, closely-related viruses were observed in
Riyadh, in the Hafr Al-Batin region as well as in Madinah, with
statistical support for direct transmission events. Any MERS-CoV
transmission model must account for this rapid virus movement
and MERS-CoV infection with no apparent live animal contact.
Furthermore, sequences from three viruses in the recently
described camel/human transmission cluster in Qatar also fall
within the Hafr Al-Batin cluster.8 The transmission testing
supports the conclusion that the Qatar human and camel viruses
are directly related to the Saudi Hafr Al-Batin cluster.
Adding the 21-day plausibility filter, (see Methods) the pattern
is reduced in complexity; however important features remain
(Figure 2, lower panel). The linkages between the Riyadh_12
patient and the patients in the Hafr Al-Batin family cluster (Hafr-
Al-Batin_4, 5 and 6) remain. In searching for alternative sources of
the infection of Patient 4 and 5, Riyadh_12 or the source of the
infection of Riyadh_12 should be considered, including exposure to
health care facilities, or health care workers, consumption or
exposure to uncooked animal products, exposure to camels or
other animals directly. A second network of transmissions passes
the plausibility test with transmissions between the Riyadh_8,
Riyadh_11 and Riyadh 17 cases and beyond to Madinah_1 and
Madinah_3.
4. Discussion
In this report we describe the possible transmission dynamics
of MERS-CoV in community case clusters from the Hafr Al-Batin
region. A cluster was defined by WHO as the occurrence of > 2
patients with onset of symptoms within an incubation period of 14
days. The transmission occurs in the same setting such as a
classroom, workplace, household, extended family, or hospital.14
Since the emergence of MERS-CoV, a number of clusters involving
more than two people14 have been reported from France,15,16 Italy,
Jordan,17 KSA,3,4,18 Tunisia,19 UAE, UK20 and Qatar. The known 14
primary cases in these clusters were adult men.21 Of the involved
individuals, 26% occurred in healthcare setting.21 The largest
healthcare associated MERS-CoV cluster was reported from Al-
Hasa, Saudi Arabia.4 In an earlier family cluster from Saudi Arabia,
an adult male index case resided in an extended household of 10
other adults and 18 children. Secondary cases were identified in
two sons, and a grandson.3 The findings from previous clusters
showed that immunocompetent contacts exhibit mild symp-
toms.20,22 In the UK cluster of MERS-CoV, two cases of MERS-CoV
infection were confirmed and one of the two cases had severe
illness. None of the 59 healthcare workers contacts had infection.20
In the Hafr Al-Batin cases reported here, 19.4% among the family
contacts tested positive and 2% of the healthcare worker contacts
were positive for MERS-CoV (p = 0.0078).
One of the differences between primary cases and secondary
cases in MERS-CoV clusters is that primary cases frequently have
no contact with a known MERS cases and are therefore thought to
acquire infection through contact with non-human sources of the
virus.23 The Hafr Al-Batin MERS Cluster 2 showed the spectrum of
illness of MERS-CoV from asymptomatic to a fulminant disease as
observed previously.3 In the current study, animal contact was
reported in 41.7% of all cases. The presence of animal contact
among asymptomatic family contacts further complicate the issue
of having secondary cases as a result of direct contact or the result
of exposure to the same source or host of MERS-CoV that lead to
the index infection. In fact, for family cluster 2, our genetic data
indicate that while Patient 8 is likely to have acquired the infection
from the index Patient 3, at least two of the infected contacts
(Patients 4 and 5) could not have been directly infected from
Patient 3 and alternate source should be considered.
Figure 2. Statistically possible transmission pairs between MERS cases infected with the Hafr-Al-Batin_1 clade of MERS-CoV. All MERS cases known to be infected with the
Hafr-Al-Batin_1 clade of MERS-CoV were plotted by sample date (x-axis) and color-coded by Hafr-Al-Batin_1 subclade as previously described 10. Upper panel: All statistically
supported transmission pairs are marked by arcs. Lower panel: Only potential transmission pairs whose collection dates differ by 21 days or less are marked by arcs. See
Methods section for additional details.
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within healthcare setting and interfamilial, the number of
secondary transmissions seem be limited and is consistent with
the R0 estimates for MERS being less than 1.11,32 This finding is
similar to previous observations from known clusters4,24,25 and
that secondary attack rates among family members of patients inother clusters appear to be low.3,4,17,25,26 In a recent large screening
study, family contacts had a higher positivity rate (3.6%) than HCW
contacts (1.12%).27 Systematic implementation of infection pre-
vention and control measures in reported clusters involving
healthcare settinghas appeared to limit onward transmission to
HCW and hospitalized patients.4,15,20,25,28,29
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November-December to March with movement of a large number
of camels both to and from Hafr Al-Batin.9 It seems that the timing
of the Hafr Al-Batin sequence divergence is consistent with the
annual fair and animal movement. It remains unclear if primary
cases had acquired MERS-CoV from direct animal contact or as a
result of contact or consumption of animal products, unpasteur-
ized camel milk and products (ice cream). Evidence that camels are
a source of human MERS-CoV infections is accumulating. Two sets
of patients with camel contacts have now been analyzed and the
sequence data support direct transmission between camel and
human, although the sequences do not allow direction of
transmission.8,30 Serological evidence that the camel infections
predate the human infection has been provided.30 Furthermore, a
full MERS-CoV genome has been obtained from a camel in Egypt;31
this combined with the high prevalence of MERS-CoV seropositiv-
ity indicates that camels may be frequently infected with the virus.
More detailed case control studies with detailed case histories,
epidemiological information and genomic analysis are being
conducted to delineate the missing pieces in the transmission
dynamics of MERS-CoV outbreak.
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